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19691 CURRENT DECISIONS
cases, the scope of the "clear conflict" test is a question which will be
presented in the future.
MICHAEL E. KRIS
Federal Taxation-PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION-CORPORAT
v. PARTNERSHIP STATUS. Empey v. United States, - F. 2d - (10th
Cir. 1969).
During the first ten months of 1965, Empey was a lawyer-employee
of a professional service organization.' On November 1 of that year he
became a ten percent shareholder. In his federal income tax return for
1965 he reported the salary he received for the first ten months, and
in addition reported ten percent of the net income of the organization
for November and December although he actually received no part of
such income. This was done in the apparent belief that the organization
was taxable as a partnership. Later, contending that the organization
should be taxed as a corporation rather than as a partnership, Empey
filed a timely claim for refund of the tax paid by him on the difference
between his salary and his share of the corporate net earnings for No-
vember and December. Through inaction, the Internal Revenue Service
rejected the claim, thereby tacitly ruling that under Treasury regula-
tions the professional service corporation was a partnership for pur-
poses of taxation. Empey brought suit in the federal district court3 to
387 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1968). But see Carey v. Local Bd., Civil No. 12,966 (D. Conn.,
filed Feb. 13, 1969) where pre-induction judicial review was granted. The require-
ments for review established in the Oestereicb decision were invoked to grant regis-
trant's petition for classification.
1. The corporation was organized under the Colorado Corporation Code. CoLO. REv.
STAT. AN. ch. 31, art. 1-10 (1963). Lawyers had been permitted to so organize by a
1961 special ruling of the Colorado Supreme Court. Coo R. Crv. P. 265.
2. Professional service corporations and associations, organized under local statutes,
vary in their characteristics from state to state. Normally, this type of organization
falls somewhere between a corporation and a partnership depending upon the
possession or non-possession of corporate attributes.
One such attribute, that of continuity of existence, is found in most professional
corporations but is restricted by the requirement that shareholders be members of the
profession practiced by the organization, e.g. medicine or law. Many states require
that the stockholder also be an employee. Dissolution and reformation of the enter-
prise are not necessary after the death or departure of a shareholder, however, as is
often the case with a partnership.
Centralization of management is a characteristic found in varying degrees among
partnerships as well as corporations and professional associations. Of course, the man-
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compel the Commissioner to recognize the corporate character of the
organization and to tax it accordingly.
The court held that, according to its interpretation of the pertinent
parts of the Internal Revenue Code of 19544 and subsequent Treasury
regulations, 5 this professional service corporation should have been
taxed as a corporation, not as a partnership. The regulations were held
to conflict with the statutory definition of a corporation6 and were, in
effect, an attempt by an executive body to perform nondelegable legis-
lative functions and as such were invalid and unenforceable. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court
decision. 7
Since 1935, the Commissioner has consistently and successfully ad-
vocated the "resemblance doctrine" to place an enterprise in the cate-
gory of a corporation." As long as an organization's characteristics
agement is subject to the necessary standards of the profession and to ethical consid-
erations
Limited liability is often a distinguishing hallmark of a business corporation, but,
depending upon state law, the professional corporation often may not achieve this
attribute and hence may more closely resemble a partnership in this respect. Liability
insurance has provided an alternative answer to this problem in some states. See, e.g.,
CoLo. R. Civ. P. 265 (I) (G).
Closely allied with the attribute of continuity of existence is that of free transfer-
ability of interest. As stated, there are restrictions placed upon transference of
interest and often the right of first refusal in the corporation is a condition precedent
to allowing an outsider to "buy in," but these restrictions are merely a variation in
the degree of transferability.
See generally Eaton, Professional Corporations and Associations in Perspective, 23
TAx L. REv. 1 (1967)
By insisting upon an overly strict application of the foregoing characteristics to
professional service corporations, the Commissioner relied upon the authority of
Treasury regulations in attempting to categorize the corporation as a partnership for
tax purposes. These regulations are discussed in notes 15 and 16, infra.
S. Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
4. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 7701 (a) (2)-(3). These sections define "corporation"
and "partnership" for federal tax purposes.
5. Infra nn.15, 16.
6. Congress did not undertake to specifically define "corporation" but merely stated
that the term includes associations. INr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (3).
7. - F.2d - (loth Cir. 1969) reported in CCH 1969 STAND. FED. TAx REP., U.S.
TAx CAs. (69-1, at 83,755) 9158 (Jan. 7, 1969).
8. The first case to invoke the doctrine was Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S.
344 (1935), where the Court held that an enterprise organized as a trust had sufficient
characteristics to be classified as an association and hence as a corporation for purposes
of taxation under the congressional "definition" of corporation. The definition was
substantially the same as that in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (3). This leading decision established the rule that if an
organization resembles a corporation it will be taxed as one. The emphasis was on
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more resemble those of a corporation than not, it is to be taxed as one.P
Congress definition of "corporation" and "partnership" 10 and the broad
regulation-making authority given to the Treasury Department11 has
enabled the Commissioner repeatedly to sweep "borderline" cases 2
into the corporate category. As members of the professions became
aware of this trend and of tax advantages accruing to the corporate
form'2 many organized as corporations.
In 1954, the first attempt to exclude professional service corporations
and associations from corporate taxability failed in United States v.
Kintner.'4 This inability to reverse the long-established pattern of
calling a "borderline" case a corporation was the catalyst leading to the
promulgation of new regulations in 1960.1' The obvious aim was to
resemblance, not identity, since an association is not. a corporation, but if enough
features of a corporation are present the organization is treated as a corporation for
taxation.
9. Such corporate attributes as continuity of existence, centralized management,
limited liability, free transferability of interests, and continuity of property ownership
were commonly examined. These attribues were not "weighted" according to relative
importance and courts appeared more concerned with theoretical or structural re-
semblance than with substantive resemblance. Eaton, supra note 2, at 4.
10. "The term 'partnership' includes . . . unincorporated organization[s] . . .
IN-r. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (2). This definition would exclude the professional
service corporation under discussion from partnership status because it was formed as
a corporation, with certain restrictions, under state law. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 31,
art. 1-10 (1963).
11. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7805.
12. See Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S. 369 (1935); Morrissey
v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); Mid-Ridge Inv. Co. v. United States, 324 F.2d
945 (7th Cir. 1963); Bert v. Helvering, 92 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Pelton v. Com-
missioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936); National Say. & Trust Co. v. United States, 285
F. Supp. 325 (D. D.C. 1968); Abraham v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Tenn.
1967). But see Mobile Bar Pilots Ass'n v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1938).
13. By being taxed as corporate entities, lawyers, doctors, and other professional men
were able, for the first time, to take advantage of tax concessions in establishing quali-
fied pension fund and profit-sharing plans. A step toward achieving benefits long
enjoyed by business corporations was thus permitted.
14. 216 F2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); accord, Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360
(N.D. Tex. 1959)
15. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -11 (1960). These regulations were called the
"Kintner Regulations" because of their obvious purpose. It became more difficult for
an organization to be in the corporate category because the new regulations placed
greater emphasis upon state law and required that an organization have a majority
of the corporate characteristics normally associated with a regular corporation. De-
ference to state law was contrary to the Commissioner's past position that local law is of
no importance. See, e.g., Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936); accord,
Treas. Reg. § 86; art. 801-1 (1935).
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indirectly overrule Kintner. The 1965 amendment to these regulations",
led to the present conflict.
Empey v. United States is the first case to be decided under the new
regulations (and the first involving a firm of lawyers). By holding the
1965 revision invalid and unenforceable, the court, in effect, decided
the case on the basis of the professional service corporation's resemblance
to "true" corporations. Other courts have already followed Empey in
passing upon the efficacy of the regulations as amended, 17 and it would
appear that the "rule of resemblance" has been implicitly reaffirmed.
HALDANE ROBERT MAYER
Products Liability-LE ER LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE HOME Cox-
STRUCTiON. Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan Association,
69 Cal. 2d 887, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
Plaintiffs purchased homes in a residential development tract from the
Conejo Valley Development Co.' Due to improper building techniques,
16. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -2 (1965); 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 553. Although the
1960 Kintner Regulations were designed to, and did, make it more difficult for associa-
tions to qualify as corporations, Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.
Fla. 1964), demonstrated that it was still possible to do so. The Commissioner did
not seek review of this decision but immediately promulgated the revision which had
been under consideration since 1963. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -2, 28 Fed.
Reg. 13750 (1963). Whereas the Kintner Regulations, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960).
emphasized the importance of local law to establish the relationship among the mem-
bers of an organization and between the organization and the public, the amendment
denigrated this standard by providing that "the labels applied by local law to
organizations . . . are in and of themselves of no importance in the classification of
such organizations for the purposes of taxation under the Internal Revenue Code."
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1965). The revised regulation further stated that an
organization, incorporated under the laws of a state, would not be considered a cor-
poration unless it met other stated criteria. See supra note 9. This was a blatant attempt
to circumvent the congressional definition of corporation as including associations
and of partnership as excluding incorporated entities.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965), a new provision, attempted to define professional
service corporations and associations out of existence as far as federal taxation was
concerned. Directed solely toward this type organization, it purported to describe how
to apply the Kintner Regulations, but its effect was to clearly demonstrate that for
all practical purposes a professional service corporation could not qualify for a cor-
porate tax classification.
17. See Wallace v. United States, reported in CCH 1968 STAND. FED. Tax REL'..
U.S. TAx CAs. (68-2, at 88,299) 9669 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 31, 1968); Holder v. United
States, 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Kurzner v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 839
(S.D. Fla. 1968); O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
1. 69 Cal. 2d 887, 447 P.2d 609,73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
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